Gatekeeping

Christophe Crombez, Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel
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Christophe Crombez: U of Leuven
Keith Krehbiel: Stanford U

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of gatekeeping is inferior to another institutional arrangement within this framework--namely, one in which the same actor is given a traditional veto instead of a gatekeeping right. The analytical results raise an empirical puzzle: When and why would self-organizing collective choice bodies adopt gatekeeping institutions? A qualitative survey of governmental institutions suggests that--contrary to an entrenched modeling norm within political science--empirical instances of codidied gatekeeping rights are rare or nonexistent.

Date: 2005-07
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