Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs
Srihari Govindan and
Robert Wilson ()
Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
Abstract:
Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even when embedded in a larger game with redundant strategies or irrelevant players (small worlds). The axioms are satisfied by a set that is stable (Mertens, 1989) and conversely the axioms imply that each selected set is stable and thus an essential component of admissible equilibria with the same outcome.
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2000.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 400 Bad Request (http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2000.pdf [302 Found]--> https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2000.pdf [302 Found]--> https://login.stanford.edu/idp/profile/SAML2/Redirect/SSO?SAMLRequest=fZLLbsIwEEV%2FJfI%2BcRLSCCwSicKiSLQgknbRTWXiCVgytutx%2Bvj7hkdb2LD2nXNnjjxGvleWTTq%2F02t47wB98LVXGtnxoSCd08xwlMg03wMy37Bq8rhgaRQz64w3jVEkmCCC89LoqdHY7cFV4D5kA8%2FrRUF23ltklG5xw63FCD3XrXEiAtHRaic3G6PA7yJEQw%2FslK6WVU2CWb%2BM1PyA%2FYcos5X6GiGFpf0qrVRwnl%2BDkA4aT6tqSYL5rCBvWdOKUcJT0QzaYTbieZ6JtIU8Gw44F0L0McQO5vqA9gVJ4zQPkySMh3U8YncZi%2FNXEqzOF99LLaTe3tazOYWQPdT1Kjzd9AIOj%2Ff0AVKOD5LZsdhdaL%2BN5b%2BuSXlhNlRfoQU0oXUiufaDf4rH9KLw1G7ZU98wn62Mks13MFHKfE4dcA8FSQgtTyPXP6T8AQ%3D%3D&RelayState=ss%3Amem%3Aaa29ad96388afa30afc60d8a28a69147bdbbaeaba53c271f93b50044442e4aa3)
Related works:
Working Paper: Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs (2008) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:2000
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().