Disruption Risk and Optimal Sourcing in Multi-tier Supply Networks

Erjie Ang, Dan A. Iancu and Robert Swinney
Additional contact information
Erjie Ang: Stanford University
Dan A. Iancu: Stanford University
Robert Swinney: Duke University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We study sourcing in a supply chain with three levels: a manufacturer, Tier 1 suppliers, and Tier 2 suppliers prone to disruption from, e.g., natural disasters like earthquakes or floods. The manufacturer may not directly dictate which Tier 2 suppliers are used, but may influence the sourcing decisions of Tier 1 suppliers via contract parameters. The manufacturer's optimal strategy depends critically on the degree of overlap in the supply chain: if Tier 1 suppliers share Tier 2 suppliers, the manufacturer relies less on direct mitigation (procuring excess inventory and multisourcing in Tier 1) and more on indirect mitigation (inducing Tier 1 suppliers to mitigate disruption risk). We also show that while the manufacturer always prefers less overlap, Tier 1 suppliers may prefer a more overlapped supply chain; however, penalty contracts--in which the manufacturer penalizes Tier 1 suppliers for a failure to deliver ordered units--alleviate this coordination problem.

Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mfd
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/worki ... tier-supply-networks

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3244

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (workingpapers@econlit.org).