The Incentives to (Not) Debate in Low-Information Races

Katherine Casey and Rachel Glennerster
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Katherine Casey: Stanford U
Rachel Glennerster: U of Chicago

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Why are there few debates in low-information elections where they have the greatest potential to inform vote choices? Consistent with weak incentives to reveal their quality or make policy commitments, we find only a quarter of Parliamentary candidates in Sierra Leone privately volunteer to debate. Publicizing their choices through guaranteed dissemination platforms allows voters to punish those who abstain and sharply increases participation. Randomly improving platform quality induces frontrunners to join. We document high voter willingness to pay to access debates and private sector interest in disseminating them, confirming that candidate reluctance and not market viability is the main barrier.

JEL-codes: D72 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:4178

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