Identifying the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation
Charles W. Calomiris
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Charles W. Calomiris: Columbia University
Working Papers from University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center
Abstract:
Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting illiquidity risk. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five frictions can be identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) an adverse-selection cost of raising equity (which favors the use of cash), (2) an opportunity cost of foregone quasi rents from lending (which favors the use of capital), (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash), (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash), and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). From the perspective of achieving the central prudential objective of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. Given that marginal costs are generally increasing along any one cost margin, the optimal policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.
Date: 2011-10
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