Incentives to Improve the Corporate Governance of Risk in Financial Institutons

Richard J. Herring
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Richard J. Herring: University of PA

Working Papers from University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center

Abstract: Although debates still rage over the causes of the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009, most analysts agree that faulty corporate governance of risk was a major contributing factor, if not the principal cause. Examples of failures in the governance of risk abound. An apparent lack of effective firm-wide oversight plagued many of the institutions that failed or required massive government intervention. Chief executive officers and boards appeared to have lacked an effective framework for imposing a consistent risk-appetite to constrain aggregate risk within acceptable limits.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:upafin:11-69

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