bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers

Domenico Menicucci and Doh-Shin Jeon

No 720, Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicing bundling. In this paper, we analyze how bundling affects journal pricing in the context of STM electronic journal market and offer a novel insight on the bundling of a large number of information goods. We find that (i) when bundling is prohibited, surprisingly, market structure does not affect prices (ii) when bundling is allowed, each publisher finds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit while reducing social welfare and (iii) any asymmetry-increasing merger is profitable but reduces social welfare

Keywords: Bundling; Site Licensing; Interconnection; Merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.26589.1080730616.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers (2015)
Journal Article: Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers (2006)
Working Paper: Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:feam04:720

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