Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns

Mehmet Bac and Parimal Bag

No 178, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: We consider a multi-stage game of fund-raising to study the announcement strategy of a fund-raiser, who is privately informed about the number of potential contributors, with the objective of collecting maximal contributions for a public project. We show that whether the public project is convex or non- convex can be the key to whether the fund-raiser announces or suppresses the information about the contributors. We also show that non-binding appeals by the fund-raiser requesting a specified minimum contribution from each contributor can often induce largest total contributions.

Date: 2000-08-01
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