Auditing with Signals

Ines Macho-Stadler and David Perez-Castrillo

No 660, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper is a first step in the analysis of the use of signals of taxpayer's incomes by tax audit authorities. In a very simple model, we consider the design of the audit strategy when the tax authority can commit to it and has free access to a signal correlated with the taxpayer's true income. We discuss the optimal enforcement policy and compare it with the optimal one when only self-reported income is considered. Our main result is that the well-known regressive bias of revenue-maximizing audit rules may be convert in a progressive one when signals are used.

Date: 2000-08-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Auditing with Signals (1999)
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