A Note on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Procurement Auctions

Gonzalo Cisternas and Nicolás Figueroa ()

No 240, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: We find a necessary and sufficient condition such that a distributional upgrade on a seller’s cost implies a lower expected procurement cost for a buyer. We also show that even under the strongest assumption about this upgrade made in the literature so far, the seller can be worse off, even if this upgrade is costless.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:240

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