 Gender premium and economic downswingsElona Shehu, Khurram Shahzad, Ghulame Rubbaniy and Abida Perveen Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2017, vol. 14, issue C, 5-13 Abstract: Using data of 2140 US firms over the period of 1998–2012, we investigate if gender–compensation relationship exists in executives’ compensation and bonus plans of the US firms; and whether this compensation difference is more visible during economic downswings. We find that not only the gender premium exists for male CEOs in executives’ compensation plans of the US companies but also the male executive bonuses are more sensitive to market downturns compared to their female counterparts. On average, female executives get a gender disadvantage in the form of lower total compensation and bonuses compared to their male counterparts, which persists even during adverse economic conditions. Finally, contrary to our initial expectations, we find male and female CEOs are equally likely to be laid-off, even during market recessions, despite female CEOs being claimed better manager by the mainstream literature. Keywords: Corporate governance; CEO compensation; Firm performance; Global financial crisis; Gender; Gender premium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:14:y:2017:i:c:p:5-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2017.03.001 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance is currently edited by Michael Dowling and Jürgen Huber More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance from Elsevier |
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