How does divergence of control and cash-flow rights influence cost stickiness?
Seungbin Oh and
Ahrum Choi
The British Accounting Review, 2025, vol. 57, issue 3
Abstract:
This study investigates whether the degree of cost stickiness depends on the divergence between control and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners using data from 22 countries. Firms with a large divergence between control and cash-flow rights are known to take more opportunistic actions at the expense of minority shareholders. The empirical results show that the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases as the divergence between control and cash-flow rights increases due to the greater incentives to manipulate earnings. Firms use both accruals earnings management (AEM) and real-activities earnings management (REM), and among REM, they adjust production activity and discretionary expense to affect cost. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between the divergence between control and cash-flow rights and cost stickiness is more pronounced in countries with weak economic, legal, and social factors. This paper, by examining the effect of ownership structure on cost behavior as well as its underlying mechanism, broadens the understanding of sticky cost behavior and contributes to the growing body of literature on the convergence of financial and managerial accounting.
Keywords: Cost stickiness; Divergence of control and cash-flow rights; Earnings management; Country-level institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0890838924002750
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:bracre:v:57:y:2025:i:3:s0890838924002750
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101495
Access Statistics for this article
The British Accounting Review is currently edited by Nathan Lael Joseph and Alan Lowe
More articles in The British Accounting Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().