Tacit collusion among dominant banks: Evidence from round-yard loan pricing

Yu-Ju Chan, Chih-Yung Lin and Tse-Chun Lin

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2025, vol. 92, issue C

Abstract: While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that approximately 70 % of bank loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude using round yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with borrowers. Tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of round yard priced loans than of non-round yard priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up loans to multiple yards rather than rounding them down. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and nonrepeat borrowers.

Keywords: Tacit collusion; Dominant banks; Round-yard pricing; Bargaining power; Loan spreads; Round up (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G24 G32 G41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:92:y:2025:i:c:s0929119925000185

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102750

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