Financialization as a strategy of workplace control in professional service firms
Johan Alvehus and
André Spicer
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, 2012, vol. 23, issue 7, 497-510
Abstract:
Recently, there has been an increased focus on finance as a form of control in corporations. In this paper, we explore financialization as an employee control strategy in a Big Four accountancy firm, and more specifically how it affects the everyday lives of the professionals within the firm. We found financialization involved attempts to transform employees working lives into an investment activity where work was experienced as ‘billable hours’ that are ‘invested’ in the hope of a high future pay-off. Employees sought to increase the value of their investment by skilful manipulation. If wisely managed, this investment could yield significant benefits in the future. We argue that financialization involves active employee participation and is a way of binding other forms of control together.
Keywords: Public interest; Accounting firms; Management Control; Financialization; Performance management; Intérêt public; Cabinets comptables; Contrôle de gestion; 公共利益; 会计师事务所; 管理控制; Interés Público; Firmas de contabilidad; Control de Gestión (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:crpeac:v:23:y:2012:i:7:p:497-510
DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2012.02.001
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