Meritocracy in a bureaucracy

Shan Aman-Rana

Journal of Development Economics, 2025, vol. 175, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS), a bureaucracy in a high-corruption, low-transparency environment, to assess whether discretion in promotion decisions allows for the use of private information on bureaucrats’ abilities. Using unique data on junior bureaucrats’ abilities and their social ties with senior officials, the study finds evidence of meritocratic promotions: senior officials are more likely to promote high-ability juniors over those with social ties, despite limited explicit incentives. I also provide evidence indicating the circumstances under which meritocratic promotions are more likely to take place. These findings suggest that discretion can lead to improved outcomes, even in settings marked by pervasive corruption.

Keywords: Promotions; Discretion; Delegation; Rules; Weberian Bureaucracy; Meritocracy; Networks; Civil service; PAS; Punjab; Pakistan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 M51 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:175:y:2025:i:c:s0304387824001779

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103428

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