Saving an old regime with new elites? The unintended effects of co-opting foreign-educated councilors in China
Chu Lin,
Wei Sun and
Chengli Wang
Journal of Development Economics, 2026, vol. 178, issue C
Abstract:
How does the co-optation of foreign-educated elites influence local stability? This study exploits a quasi-experimental setting created by the establishment of provincial Consultative Bureaus in China in 1909 to examine the political consequences of integrating Japan-educated returnees into local governance. Using an original, prefecture-by-month panel dataset across 262 prefectures from 1901 to 1911, we find that co-opting foreign-educated elites produced unintended effects: it significantly reduced revolutionary armed struggles (the “revolution effect”), but simultaneously increased peasant revolts (the “revolt effect”). Mechanism analysis suggests that returnees advocated reforms that intensified local tax burdens—particularly in economically strained regions—provoking peasant revolts. Our findings underscore a critical trade-off in the modernization efforts of autocratic regimes: when elites’ reformist ambitions outpace the adaptive capacity of society, well-intended reforms can generate unintended backlash.
Keywords: Local council; Co-optation; Foreign-educated elites; Popular revolts; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 N45 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:178:y:2026:i:c:s0304387825001312
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103580
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