Using the law to change the custom

Gani Aldashev, Imane Chaara, Jean-Philippe Platteau () and Zaki Wahhaj

Journal of Development Economics, 2012, vol. 97, issue 2, 182-200

Abstract: The custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity-increasing changes. In this paper, we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can, under certain conditions, shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator. Formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a 'magnet effect’ on the custom. We also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population. We illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance, marriage, and divorce in Sub-Saharan Africa and India.

Keywords: Custom; Statutory law; Legal reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 K40 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

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Working Paper: Using the Law to Change the Custom (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:97:y:2012:i:2:p:182-200

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.03.001

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