Salience and information avoidance in voluntary carbon offsetting decisions: Evidence from online experiments
Nicola Campigotto,
Chiara Gioia and
Matteo Ploner
Ecological Economics, 2025, vol. 233, issue C
Abstract:
This paper investigates the behavioural drivers of voluntary carbon offsets, which allow individuals to reduce their emissions by funding environmental and energy projects. Despite the growth of the voluntary carbon market, the factors influencing these decisions remain under-researched. This study uses two incentivized online experiments to examine the role of information salience and information avoidance as determinants of offsetting behaviour. The results indicate that: (i) when carbon emissions are more saliently linked to consumption activities, contributions to offset programmes increase; (ii) individuals with a lower pro-environmental orientation tend to avoid information about their emissions, leading to lower contributions; and (iii) deliberate avoidance or pursuit of information can either reduce or increase contributions, respectively, compared to scenarios where information is either unavailable or provided by default.
Keywords: Information avoidance; Online experiment; Salience; Voluntary carbon offsets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:233:y:2025:i:c:s0921800925000606
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2025.108577
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