Taxation and capital structure choice--Evidence from a panel of German multinationals

Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thiess Büttner

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 3, 309-311

Abstract: The capital structure of foreign affiliates is analyzed using a large panel of German multinationals. While taxes are found to encourage debt finance in general, adverse local credit market conditions result in lower external borrowing but higher internal debt indicating that the two channels of debt finance are substitutes.

Keywords: Corporate; income; tax; Multinationals; Capital; structure; Internal; debt; Firm-level; data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Taxation and Capital Structure Choice – Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals (2006)
Working Paper: Taxation and capital structure choice: evidence from a panel of German multinationals (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:3:p:309-311

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