Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game

Rossella Argenziano and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 509-512

Abstract: We show that in a preemption game of entry into a Cournot market, increasing the number of competitors beyond duopoly does not bring forward the time of first entry. We also show that all entries, except the first one, occur earlier than socially optimal.

Keywords: Timing games; Preemption; Dynamic entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:509-512

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.009

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