An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo

Georgy Artemov

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 3, 380-385

Abstract: In this paper, virtual implementation is restricted to deliver, on the equilibrium path, either a socially optimal outcome or a status quo: an outcome fixed for all preference profiles. Under such a restriction, for any unanimous and implementable social choice function there is a dictator, who obtains her most preferable outcome as long as all agents prefer this outcome to the status quo. Further restrictions on the lottery space and the range of social choice functions allow the dictator to impose her most preferred outcome even when other agents prefer the status quo to this outcome.

Keywords: Virtual implementation; Social choice rules; Dictatorial rules; Admissible support (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513005545
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:3:p:380-385

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.015

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().