On the existence of Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with infinite actions

Haifeng Fu

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: We show that each mixed strategy of a normal-form game can be reformulated as a pure strategy of an induced Bayesian game. Moreover, a normal-form game has a Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if its induced Bayesian game has a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. By relying on the existence result of Pareto undominated pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games in Fu and Yu (2015), we also show that every normal-form game has a Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Bayesian game; Normal-form game; Pareto undominated pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:201:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000483

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109771

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