Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits

Bin Wu and Hanping Xu

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 215, issue C

Abstract: A general condition called “coarser traits” is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of pure-strategy, Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria in a class of large games with traits.

Keywords: Coarser traits; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-undominated; Socially-maximal; Large games with traits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001057

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110464

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