Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements

Rakesh Chaturvedi

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 230, issue C

Abstract: For trade involving perfect complements and fragmented ownership, lower bounds on the deficit cost of supporting efficiency is provided by first providing informative estimates for the generalized VCG mechanism, then doing so for all incentive-feasible direct mechanisms, and finally for all voluntary trading mechanisms.

Keywords: Holdout problem; Mechanism design; Trading complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D82 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:230:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002616

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111236

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