Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk: A correction

Oscar Volij

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 247, issue C

Abstract: This note corrects a mistake in Volij (2002) “Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk,” Economics Letters, 76(2), 231–237. It shows the payoff equivalence of a family of auctions when risk-averse bidders behave according to Yaari’s dual theory of choice under risk.

Keywords: Auctions; Non-expected utility; Risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006232

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112139

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