A characterization of pairwise dictatorial approbatory social welfare functions

Gustavo Santos-García and José Carlos R. Alcantud

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 248, issue C

Abstract: This paper defines approbatory social welfare functions. They are the natural counterpart of Arrovian social welfare functions when the expression of preferences is accompanied by a common choice of “approved” alternatives in a consistent manner. First, we count the number of consistent preference-approval profiles (the domain of approbatory social welfare functions). Then we show that pairwise dictatorial behaviors are characterized by unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, a replication of Arrow’s characterization of dictatorships for this restricted version of the preference-approval model defined by Brams and Sanver in 2009.

Keywords: Ranking; Approval; Social welfare function; Voting; Dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:248:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525000540

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112217

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