Competitive outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock contest

Matthew J. Robertson

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 250, issue C

Abstract: I endogenise the value of the prize in an N-player Tullock contest as the total market revenue obtained in Cournot competition under linear inverse demand. The contest designer, by choosing the parameter relating players’ outputs to their share of market revenue, can maximise total surplus by implementing the perfectly competitive outcome. In contrast, the parameter that maximises players’ payoffs leads them to produce one-half of the perfectly competitive output, which is equivalent to 1/N of the monopoly output.

Keywords: Tullock contest; Cournot competition; Perfect competition; Contest design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:250:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001223

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112285

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