Information quality in sequential persuasion

Wataru Kitano

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 254, issue C

Abstract: In Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders disclosing information sequentially, the conditions under which the entry of new senders can reduce information quality remain ambiguous. This paper shows that informativeness-reducing entry can occur if and only if the incumbent sender exhibits a sufficiently strong aversion to full disclosure.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Sequential persuasion; Competitive disclosure; Belief-splitting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525002897

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112452

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