School choice with rank-dependent priorities

Yasuo Sasaki

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 255, issue C

Abstract: We extend the standard school choice problem by allowing schools’ priority orders to depend on the rankings submitted by students. In this setting, the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm using such modified priorities is no longer strategy-proof, and moreover stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible.

Keywords: School choice; Matching; Rank-dependent priority; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:255:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525003386

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112501

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