Energy international trade pattern under the background of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: A method based on complex network and evolutionary game theory

Di Wang, Yiman Li and Xianqi Zhang

Energy Economics, 2025, vol. 149, issue C

Abstract: The architecture of global energy trade is characterized by the collective efforts of participating countries. Under such status quo, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict set off a series of energy-related sanctions and countermeasures between Western countries and Russia, disrupting the established patterns of international energy trade. This study seeks to provide a thorough, in-depth, and unbiased examination of how the Russia-Ukraine conflict has influenced the global energy trade dynamics. We developed a four-party evolutionary game model that is intricately connected to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, featuring Russia, the EU, the U.S., and China as principal players. This model skillfully combines the complexities of network methods with the evolutionary game theory, resulting in a directed graph network structure. Based on the initial analysis of fluctuating trade data, we conducted a longitudinal time series evaluation of trade variation among these four countries. Following this, we employed complex network statistical measures such as Out-degree, In-degree, Clustering Coefficient, Betweenness Centrality, and Closeness Centrality for an in-depth quantitative exploration of the policy orientation coefficients of these countries. This research, set against the Russia-Ukraine conflict, has arrived at several key findings: 1) The Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) dictates that Russia should adopt counter-sanction tactics, the EU should implement sanctions, the U.S. should encourage conflict, and China should increasing its energy imports from Russia. 2) The decision-making process of the U.S. holds some sway over the EU's choices. 3) The U.S. is unlikely to instigate conflicts when the conflict level is extremely high or low. However, it tends to do so when the conflict level is moderate, aiming to derive benefits. 4) The development of new energy sources is likely to shift the EU's stance on the conflict. 5) The prices of international energy have a significant effect on the strategic decisions of energy-exporting countries, notably the U.S. and Russia. In conclusion, this study offers a scientific foundation for policy-making, aiding countries in devising strategies and policies to mitigate the effects of geopolitical risks on the international energy trade dynamics. In addition, it delves into the evolution of the international energy trade landscape from a developmental viewpoint, highlighting potential risks that the global energy market may encounter during the energy transition phase.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Complex networks; International energy trade pattern; Russia-Ukraine conflict; Policy inclination coefficient (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:149:y:2025:i:c:s0140988325005808

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108753

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