Incentive mechanism design for the residential building energy efficiency improvement of heating zones in North China
Y. Zhong,
W.G. Cai,
Y. Wu and
H. Ren
Energy Policy, 2009, vol. 37, issue 6, 2119-2123
Abstract:
Starting with analyzing the investigation results by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China in 2005, more than half of the 10,236 participants are willing to improve the residential building energy efficiency and accept an additional cost of less than 10% of the total cost, the authors illustrate that incenting actions are necessary to improve building energy efficiency and build a central government-local government-market model. As a result of the model analysis, to pursue good execution effects brought by the incentive policies, the executors are required to distinguish the differences of incentive objects' economic activities and strongly respect the incenting on the energy conservation performance. A case study on the incentive policies of existing residential building energy efficiency improvement in heating zones in North China is given as well. Finally, it is strongly recommended to give the first priority to performance-based incentives so that to reduce the lazy behaviors of the incented objects and ensure the targets to be achieved.
Keywords: Building; energy; conservation; Incentive; mechanism; Energy; efficiency; improvement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:37:y:2009:i:6:p:2119-2123
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