Regulatory intervention on the dynamic European gas market--neoclassical economics or transaction cost economics?

Aldo R. Spanjer

Energy Policy, 2009, vol. 37, issue 8, 3250-3258

Abstract: Shifts at the international gas market indicate that the transaction cost perspective provides better underpinnings for European gas regulation than the current neoclassical perspective. Three implications are that policymakers should: (1) allow alternative coordination measures to complement market exchange; (2) recognize that less than perfect competition outcomes may be optimal and (3) be more reticent in prescribing interventionist measures. Finally, the analysis provides the foundations for the empirical research required to complement this paper's theoretical approach.

Keywords: European; gas; regulation; Neoclassical; economics; Transaction; cost; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301-4215(09)00272-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:37:y:2009:i:8:p:3250-3258

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Policy is currently edited by N. France

More articles in Energy Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().