Acquirer board independence and acquisitions performance: A meta-analysis

Mussa Hussaini

International Review of Financial Analysis, 2025, vol. 102, issue C

Abstract: Using meta-analytical techniques, this study examines whether and how acquirer board independence affects acquisition performance. It also investigates the moderating effects of country-level formal institutions on this relationship to shed light on the fragmented empirical results reported by prior studies. Using a sample of 85 primary studies representing 646 effect sizes and a total of 1,131,639 observations, the overall results indicate a positive and significant relationship between acquirer board independence and acquisition performance. Moreover, the results of the three-level meta-regression analysis reveal that the country-level formal institutional factor of shareholder rights negatively moderates the focal relationship, while creditor rights have, at best, a minimal impact. This study blends insights from two theoretical perspectives—agency theory and transaction cost economics—and clarifies the strength and direction of the association between acquirer board independence and acquisition performance. Moreover, by incorporating institutional theory to examine the moderating effects of formal institutions, this study sheds light on how broader institutional contexts impact the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and their value implications in acquisition transactions. Accordingly, this study provides novel findings with empirically validated theoretical underpinnings.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Board independence; Acquisition performance; Institutional context; Meta-analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521925002170
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finana:v:102:y:2025:i:c:s1057521925002170

DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104130

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Financial Analysis is currently edited by B.M. Lucey

More articles in International Review of Financial Analysis from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().