CFO social networks and corporation taxation

Ming Fang, Qiang Wu, Xu, Xin (Emma) and Zejiang Zhou

Journal of Financial Stability, 2025, vol. 78, issue C

Abstract: Despite the significance of social networks in influencing firm behavior, research on their impact on corporate tax behavior is limited. In this paper, we construct social networks of CFOs from U.S. companies based on their employment history, education, and non-professional activities. We find that firms with more socially connected CFOs have lower effective tax rates (ETR) compared to firms with less socially connected CFOs. This effect is more pronounced when corporate governance is weaker and managers have higher incentives. Furthermore, a firm's ETR decreases as CFO centrality increases. We do not observe similar results regarding the connectedness of boards of directors. Additionally, firm pairs exhibit similar ETRs when their CFOs are socially connected, suggesting an exchange of tax-related information among CFOs through their social networks. We also find that the past ETRs of firms with central CFOs predict the ETRs of firms with non-central CFOs. This indicates that less socially connected CFOs tend to follow the tax planning strategies of their more socially connected counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate that more socially connected CFOs possess more relevant information and resources regarding tax planning, leading to the adoption of more aggressive tax strategies compared to their less socially connected counterparts.

Keywords: Tax avoidance; Social networks; CFO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 H26 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finsta:v:78:y:2025:i:c:s1572308925000348

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101405

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