Revealed social preferences and joint forest management outcomes

Pradeep Kumar and Shashi Kant

Forest Policy and Economics, 2016, vol. 72, issue C, 37-45

Abstract: We explored the role of revealed social preferences in the variation of JFM outcomes. To find out the social preferences of villagers, public goods game was organized in five randomly chosen villages in central India. At the village level, strong positive correlation was found between the average allocation to public good in the game and success of JFM in the village. In two villages, which had high success in JFM, villagers' social preferences were reciprocity, while in three other villages, which had moderate to low success in JFM, villagers' social preferences were commitment. We also found that demographic, economic, and social factors did not consistently explain individuals' preferences.

Keywords: Joint forest management; Social preference; Public goods game; Reciprocity; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:forpol:v:72:y:2016:i:c:p:37-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.06.013

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