Economic, political and socio-cultural welfare in media merger control: An analysis of the Belgian and Dutch competition authorities’ reviews of media mergers
Miriam Van der Burg and
Hilde Van den Bulck
Information Economics and Policy, 2015, vol. 32, issue C, 2-15
Abstract:
The premise of consumer welfare in competition law entails that National Competition Authorities (NCAs) weigh both economic and non-economic interests of consumers against those of producers. This contribution distinguishes between economic, socio-cultural and political welfare to evaluate whether NCAs examine a merger’s impact against the width of consumer interest. A claim analysis is conducted of the NCAs’ formal decisions on eight selected cases of proposed media mergers. The analysis shows that, in recent years, these NCAs pay attention to non-economic interests of consumers, but remain vague as to, first, what interests in particular are at stake; second, who the stakeholders are; and, third, how these interests are weighed. The results suggest potential to increase consumer welfare by safeguarding the media’s political and socio-cultural role in particular. To this end, first, the perspective of individuals as citizens must prevail; second, specific tests must review the impact of media mergers on political and socio-cultural welfare; and, third, NCAs and Media Regulatory Authorities (MRAs) must bundle strengths.
Keywords: Media mergers; Consumer welfare; Public interest; Competition law; National competition authority; Small media markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 G34 K21 L82 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:32:y:2015:i:c:p:2-15
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.07.002
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