Reputational cost of securities fraud in japan under a public-enforcement-centered sanction regime

Zhu, Qiaochu (Amy)

International Review of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 63, issue C

Abstract: In American legal discourse, many commentators believe that the best way to deter securities fraud is the class action, despite its serious side effect: frivolous litigation. A comparative study of securities fraud in Japan, which had an identical securities code addressing securities fraud with the U.S. before the adoption of class action, however, presents a different story.

Keywords: Securities regulation; Investors protection; Public enforcement; Reputational cost; Comparative law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0144818820301289

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105915

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