 Finance and development: Rethinking the role of financial transparencyJournal of Banking & Finance, 2020, vol. 111, issue C Abstract: Over the last decade many developing countries strengthened their transparency standards with the objective of improving asset market allocations and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper develops a general equilibrium model and argues that in a financially underdeveloped economy - with uninsurable consumption risk and stochastic-investment - enforcing financial transparency might be counterproductive. The framework builds upon a standard property that illiquid asset markets cause under-investment in assets that pay in the long-run, because individually rational agents hoard cash to exploit sales of underpriced long-term assets. First, I show that in this environment private revelation of news about investment-returns could give a chance to sell low-quality assets and then characterize the conditions under which the lack of financial transparency reduces under-investment and improves macroeconomic development. An empirical analysis reveals that the theoretical predictions of the model is in line with cross-country data. Keywords: Financial development; Transparency; Adverse selection; Under-investment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:111:y:2020:i:c:s0378426619302948 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.105721 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.