Earned/contributed capital, dividend policy, and disclosure quality: An international study
Paul Brockman and
Emre Unlu
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011, vol. 35, issue 7, 1610-1625
Abstract:
We examine the agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country variations in disclosure environments. The outcome hypothesis posits that transparent disclosure environments lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can more accurately measure (and therefore demand) excess cash flows. In contrast, the substitute hypothesis argues that opaque disclosure environments lead to higher payouts because managers have stronger incentives to establish their reputation for fair treatment. Our empirical results confirm both hypotheses and contribute to the literature in two primary ways. First, we confirm that the lifecycle theory of dividends explains dividend payout patterns around the world. Second, and more important, we show that the firm's disclosure environment plays a significant role in dividend payouts through its effect on agency costs; that is, we confirm an agency cost-inclusive lifecycle theory of dividends.
Keywords: Dividend; policy; Lifecycle; theory; Agency; costs; Accounting; disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:7:p:1610-1625
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