Gender minority: A non-pecuniary approach to political capital

Qingfeng Cai, Dongxu Li and Hao Liu

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2025, vol. 53, issue 3, 834-855

Abstract: Social minority benefits from in-group favoritism, and companies may leverage it as a non-pecuniary strategy to access political capital. We examine gendered implications of corporate responses to city-level political turnovers, specifically when the leadership shifts from male to female politician. We show that the politician turnover induces firms headquartered in that city to increase the presence of women on the board of directors, particularly in the chairman or CEO position. This result is unlikely driven by gender equality concerns or other firm characteristics. Firms selecting a female director witness significantly increased financial support from the government. This paper suggests that gender minority can be a subtle way accessing political capital, and boosting female representation can help curb the in-group favoritism.

Keywords: Gender minority; Political capital; Gender; Board of directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 G30 G38 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:53:y:2025:i:3:p:834-855

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2025.05.007

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