Inequality averse criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams: The impossibility of Weak Pareto

José Alcantud ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 1, 353-363

Abstract: This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare improvements by every generation. The case of Hammond Equity for the Future is investigated too.

Keywords: Social welfare function; Equity; Inequality aversion; Pareto axiom; Intergenerational justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Inequality averse criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams: The impossibility of Weak Pareto (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:1:p:353-363

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.01.006

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