A tractable group all-pay auction

Stefano Barbieri and Iryna Topolyan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 226, issue C

Abstract: We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution of the correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects of value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game in which players engage in costless unmediated preplay communication.

Keywords: All-pay auction; Correlated equilibrium; Constant elasticity of substitution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:226:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125000626

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016

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