Egoist's dilemma: a DEA game

Ken Nakabayashi and Kaoru Tone

Omega, 2006, vol. 34, issue 2, 135-148

Abstract: This paper deals with problems of consensus-making among individuals or organizations with multiple criteria for evaluating their performance when the players are supposed to be egoistic; in the sense that each player sticks to his superiority regarding the criteria. We analyze this situation within the framework or concept developed in data envelopment analysis (DEA). This leads to a dilemma called the `egoist's dilemma'. We examine this dilemma using cooperative game theory and propose a solution. The scheme developed in this paper can also be applied to attaining fair cost allocations as well as benefit-cost distributions.

Keywords: Game; theory; Cooperative; game; DEA; Variable; weight; Shapley; value; Nucleolus; Assurance; region; method; Cost; allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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