Compensations and contributions under an international carbon treaty

Laurence Seidman and Kenneth Lewis

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2009, vol. 31, issue 3, 341-350

Abstract: This paper provides a numerical illustration of how an international carbon treaty might work. The simulations in this paper using 2004 data on carbon emissions and per capita GDP from 178 countries suggest that high-income countries might be much better off collectively compensating low-income countries through an international treaty to help reduce carbon emissions rather than reducing carbon emissions without their help.

Keywords: Carbon; treaty; Carbon; tax; Carbon; permits; Compensation; Contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Compensations and contributions under an international carbon treaty (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:31:y:2009:i:3:p:341-350

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