Bailouts: The lesser of two evils?

Silvia Calo'

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2019, vol. 41, issue 1, 84-98

Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between bailouts and regulation. Regulation, by limiting the room for government intervention in the market, can affect the likelihood and size of a bailout. While a higher level of regulation is associated with a lower likelihood of a direct acquisition, such countries resort to a higher use of State aid. The findings suggest the more transparent nature of direct acquisitions, makes them the lesser of two evils. In this light, policymakers should monitor State Aid and bailouts together, with the aim of making the former more transparent.

Keywords: Bailouts; Regulation; State aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 H12 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:41:y:2019:i:1:p:84-98

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.06.007

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