Evolutionary dynamics in common oil resource management for enhancing long-term strategic interactions

Seyed Pendar Toufighi, Iman Ghasemian Sahebi and Zahra Soltani

Resources Policy, 2025, vol. 105, issue C

Abstract: This study explores the application of evolutionary game theory to optimize long-term extraction strategies for common oil fields, focusing on the North Pars field shared by Iran and Qatar. The research aims to identify optimal management policies for shared resources by modeling the strategic interactions between these countries. The analysis incorporates key factors such as recovery rates, and information asymmetry, providing a realistic framework for decision-making. The study reveals that full cooperation between Iran and Qatar yields the highest long-term payoffs, emphasizing the benefits of strategic alignment. However, the game-theoretic model also indicates an equilibrium where Iran cooperates, and Qatar does not, resulting in higher payoffs for Qatar. This highlights the challenges in achieving mutual cooperation and underscores the need for robust legal frameworks and negotiation strategies. Using real data from the North Pars field, the mathematical model optimizes extraction values and payoffs, demonstrating the potential of technological advancements and strategic planning. The optimized extraction rates are 147,865 barrels per day for Iran and 265,748 barrels per day for Qatar. The study shows that increasing a country's potential payoff accelerates the convergence towards a stable, cooperative strategy. The findings suggest that evolutionary strategies, informed by dynamic geopolitical and economic conditions, enhance the management of shared oil resources.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary stable strategy; Common oil reservoir; Shared resource extraction; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:105:y:2025:i:c:s0301420725001394

DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105597

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