Harvesting regulation under quota management systems for ocean fisheries: Decision making in the face of natural variability, weak information, risks and conflicting incentives

Peter H. Pearse and Carl J. Walters

Marine Policy, 1992, vol. 16, issue 3, 167-182

Abstract: Decisions about harvest levels are the most crucial responsibilities of fisheries managers, but the outcomes are always more or less uncertain. The risk depends largely on the information available. Fisheries biologists, trained to assess the probabilities of outcomes from management decisions, are too often also expected to decide what risks should be taken. Emerging fisheries management regimes based on individual fishermen's quotas, best exem-plified by New Zealand's quota management system, redirect the incentives of those with harvesting rights to cooperate in improved management, including improved information-gathering. Under these regimes, most management decisions can be made by quota-holders themselves, although safeguards are needed to protect the broader public interest in resource management.

Date: 1992
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