The nature and evolution of cooperative fishing arrangements in extended jurisdiction zones

Lewis E Queirolo, Richard S Johnston and Zhengkun Zhang

Marine Policy, 1997, vol. 21, issue 3, 255-266

Abstract: Following the global extension of marine fishery jurisdiction, cooperative fishing arrangements have emerged between coastal nations and distant water fleets. Economic analysis of these arrangements to date has emphasized their bilateral nature and the associated difficulties of influencing and monitoring behavior, including incentive gaps resulting from differing perceptions of the future. When it is recognized that there are many buyers and sellers of "access", and that the resources themselves are heterogeneous, the magnitude of such gaps diminishes. We develop a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence supporting the position that a competitive "international market for access" is evolving.

Keywords: EEZ; joint-ventures; property; rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:marpol:v:21:y:1997:i:3:p:255-266

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