Fisheries rent creation and distribution--the imaginary case of Codland

Ola Flaaten

Marine Policy, 2010, vol. 34, issue 6, 1268-1272

Abstract: This paper discusses actual and possible achievements and failures of Codland and examines it from the point of view of efficiency and in terms of distribution. Joint analysis of the two approaches is needed when contemplating fisheries management reforms, since such reforms may create both winners and losers. The analysis demonstrates how rent drain from fishing communities and countries may occur despite significant resource rent creation. The change in the Codland economy is illustrated and compared to that of actual countries and to resource economic theory. It is concluded that if distributional and equity objectives matter, other instruments than ITQs, such as conditional tradeable fish quotas and vessel licences, resource taxes, co-management, public ownership, auctions, leases, time limited rights, time and area regulations, territorial user rights (TURFs) and marine protected areas (MPAs), should also be used.

Keywords: Resource; rent; Rent; distribution; Rent; drain; ITQ; Licence; Transitional; gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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