Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule

Clinton Gubong Gassi and Frank Steffen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025, vol. 135, issue C

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify the multi-winner voting rules that can be considered as extensions of the Plurality rule when voters’ preferences are expressed as linear rankings over the candidates. Multi-winner voting addresses the problem of selecting a fixed-size subset of candidates, called a committee, from a larger set of available candidates based on the voters’ preferences. In the single-winner setting, where each voter provides a strict ranking of the candidates and the goal is to select a unique candidate, Yeh (2008) characterized the Plurality rule as the only voting rule satisfying five independent axioms: anonymity, neutrality, consistency, efficiency, and top-only. In this paper, we demonstrate that a natural extension of these axioms to the multi-winner framework allows us to identify a class of top-kcounting rules as multi-winner analogous to the Plurality rule, that does not contain the classical k-Plurality rule.

Keywords: Multi-winner; Voting rules; Axioms; Plurality rule; Top-k counting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489625000204
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:135:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000204

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102405

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().